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INTRODUCTION

Men and women in the young American Republic held
ancient Rome in esteem, sometimes almost to the point of veneration. They admired its architecture, its language and literature,
its public institutions, even its personal names, drawing inspiration from what they knew of classical sources.' Current developments in European thought also commanded the attention
and respect of many Americans in the years following the Revo* Ruth Wyatt Rosenson Professor of Law, University of Chicago. The author's
research on this Article has benefitted from material assistance by the Morton C. Seeley
Fund and the Elsie 0. and Philip D. Sang Faculty Fund, both administered by the
University of Chicago. His presentation of the results of the research was improved by
presenting the paper to a workshop at Boston University Law School, and subsequently by
comments from Mary Ann Glendon, David Seipp, and Shael Herman. His conclusions
were improved by a perceptive and difficult question from Donald L. Horowitz.
1. See generally Meyer Reinhold, Survey of the Scholarship on ClassicalTraditions in
Early America, in CLASSICAL TRADITIONS IN EARLY AMERICA I (John W. Eadie ed.,

1976). On American lawyers, see the evidence collected and the remarks in HERBERT A.
JOHNSON, IMPORTED EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY LAW TREATISES IN AMERICAN LIBRARIES

1700-1799, at xxiv (1978).
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lutionary War.2 The former colonists had looked to the Continent for support during the War, and they continued to look to
the Continent for some of their most basic notions about the
right ordering of society.'
The question for anyone interested in the growth of American law, however, cannot rest with noting a general admiration
for classical and European ideas. Instead, one must ask whether
or not this habit of mind made any substantial difference in the
development of American law. On this subject, various opinions
have been expressed. Some commentators have minimized any
influence
coming from civil-law sources.' A few have magnified
it. 5 The dominant view today, however, is undoubtedly the one
elegantly expressed by Professor Peter Stein in an article published some twenty-five years ago. Stein concluded that the civil
law played its principal role in the education of elite American
lawyers.6 Although "its impact on the legal practitioners was
disappointing," he wrote, "the campaign for civil law had more
success in the field of legal education." 7
Stein found that the study of Roman law served as a broadening and enlightening introduction to the science of the law for
young American lawyers.8 The civil law provided a happy alternative to immediate immersion in the arcana of practice that
would otherwise have overwhelmed the beginner required first
to sample and then to digest Sir Edward Coke's treatise on Littleton's Tenures and the other crabbed learning of the English
common law. But that was all. In the courtroom, it made little
2. See M.H. Hoeflich, TransatlanticFriendships& the German Influence on American
Law in the First Half ofthe Nineteenth Century, 35 AM. J. COMP. L. 599, 599-601 (1987).
3. See CHARLES F. MULLETT, FUNDAMENTAL LAW AND THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 1760-1776, at 32 (1933); Donald S.Lutz, The Relative Influence of European
Political Writers on Late Eighteenth-CenturyAmerican PoliticalThought, 78 AM. POL. SCI.
REV. 189passim (1984).
4. See, e.g., KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY
10 (1989) ("The civil law tradition contributed only modestly to the origins of American
law."); C. Paul Rogers III, Scots Law in Post-Revolutionary and Nineteenth-Century
America: The Neglected Jurisprudence,8 LAW & HIST. REV. 205, 206 (1990) (arguing to
the effect that "few American lawyers had any knowledge or understanding of French or
civilian legal systems").

5. See, e.g., Richard M. Gummere, The ClassicalAncestry of the United States Constitution, 14 AM. Q. 3 passim (1962).
6. See Peter Stein, The Attraction of the Civil Law in Post-RevolutionaryAmerica, 52
VA. L. REV. 403, 423 (1966), reprinted in PETER STEIN, THE CHARACTER AND INFLUENCE OF THE ROMAN CIVIL LAW 431-39 (1988).
7. Id
8. Id.
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headway. 9 Other recent work on this subject has reached similar
conclusions. 10 American lawyers regarded Roman law and the
Continental legal tradition as aids to understanding the overall
structure of the law, 1 or as scholarly adornment to be used to12
impress others in the rude environment of their new nation.
Civil law served this secondary function; it was not a working
component of American jurisprudence.
There is undoubtedly much to be said in favor of this view.
The evidence of the ways in which the civil law was used in
training young lawyers, unearthed and sifted by Stein, Hoeffich,
and other scholars, is undoubted and impressive. To this writer,
however, their conclusion seemed unsatisfying, and in its negative implications, actually unlikely. It seemed unsatisfying in
that, within a legal system like ours in which so much depends
on judges and cases, to speak of civilian influence that makes no
difference in the decisional law is to speak of a very marginal
sort of influence. It seemed unlikely in that, assuming American
lawyers knew and used the civil law for purposes of legal education, systematic thinking, and scholarly adornment, it would be
natural to think that these well-springs of admiration would spill
over into the cases. Can human minds, even the minds of lawyers, easily keep their interests quite so separate? I thought not.
Dissatisfaction spurred investigation. The scope of the
investigation begun in consequence included reading as many
9. Id
10. See, e-g., PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA 169 (1965) ("In
practice the courts and the writers of textbooks did not make such extensive use of the Civil
Law as the learned advocates pretended."); M.H. Hoeffich, John Austin andJoseph Story:
Two Nineteenth Century Perspectives on the Utility of the Civil Law for the Common Lawyer, 29 AM. J. LEGAL Hisr. 36, 75 (1985) (arguing that the function of the civil law is "to
elevate the study of law to a university level") [hereinafter Hoeffich, Perspectives]; M.H.
Hoeflich, Roman and Civil Law in American Legal Education and Research Priorto 1930:
A PreliminarySurvey, 1984 U. ILL. L. REv. 718 passim [hereinafter Hoeffich, Roman and
Civil Law].
11. See Charles Donahue Jr., The Civil Law in England, 84 YALE L.J. 167, 179-81
(1974) (Book Review); see also F.H. Lawson, Roman Law as an OrganizingInstrument,46
B.U. L. REV. 181, 197 (1966); Michael Lobban, Blackstone and the Science of Law, 30
HIST. J. 311, 321 (1987) (describing Blackstone as using Roman law "in order to prove that
[English law] was a logical structure"); Calvin Woodard, Progressand Poverty in American
Law andLegal Education, 37 SYRACUSE L. REv. 795, 808 (1986) (finding that the Roman
law was important for Langdell in promoting "the notion of 'jural relations' and legal
classification").
12. Daniel R. Coquillette, Justinianin Braintree:John Adams, Civilian Learningand
Legal Elitism, 1758-1775, in LAW IN COLONIAL MASSACHUSETTS 1630-1800, at 359, 36066 (Daniel R. Coquillette et al. eds., 1984); Hoeflich, Perspectives, supra note 10, at 74
(finding that its function in part is to provide "pleasant excursions into esoteric learning").
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American cases decided between 1790 and 1825 as possible, noting whether and in what circumstances Continental sources
were used. No one, it appeared, had undertaken this plodding
assignment before.13 The search entailed looking at all American jurisdictions 14 for which any appreciable number of reports
survived from before 1825.15 There were fourteen in all.16 To
their number were added cases from the various federal courts
and United States Supreme Court. Although it would certainly
have been burdensome, and probably also unnecessary, to read
all the reports, it was possible to keep reading within each jurisdiction until a considerable accumulation of notes from each had
developed.1 7 At the end of the day, patterns had emerged from
these labors, and they are the subject of this Article.
II.

EXTENT OF KNOWLEDGE AND USE OF THE CIVIL LAW

A.

Evidence of Usage of Civilian Sources

Investigation fully justified doubts about the conclusion
that the influence of the civil law was confined to legal education, although it in no way conflicted with the finding that the
civil law also served a broader educational purpose for American
13. See Hoeflich, Roman and Civil Law, supra note 10, at 722. The older studies
cited are practically devoid of reference to case law. Lewis C. Cassidy, The Teaching and
Study ofRoman Law in the United States, 19 GEo. L.J. 297passim (1931); Roscoe Pound,
The Influence of the Civil Law in America, 1 LA. L. REv. 1 passim (1938). The only
exception known to me is W. Hamilton Bryson, The Use of Roman Law in Virginia Courts,
28 AM. J. LEGAL HisT. 135, 138 passim (1984) (citing several cases to illustrate Roman
influence on Virginia law from the Colonial period up to 1900).
14. Louisiana was omitted because of its civil-law heritage, well surveyed in this context in Shael Herman, The Influence of Roman Law upon the Jurisprudenceof Antebellum
Louisiana, in 2 THE CLASSICAL TRADmION AND THE AMERICAS (Wolfgang Haase &
Hildegard Temporini eds., forthcoming 1992). See generally GEORGE DARGO, JEFFERSON'S LOUISIANA: POLITICS AND THE CLASH OF LEGAL TRADITIONS (1975); H.F.
Jolowicz, The Civil Law in Louisiana, 29 TUL. L. REV. 491 (1955).
15. A few states, Indiana, Michigan, and Missouri, for example, published one report
or only part of one report before 1825. They were not included in the survey because of the
small sample they provided.
16. They are Connecticut, Georgia, Kentucky, Maryland, Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Vermont, and Virginia.
17. For purposes of this Article, evident differences in time and juristic approach
between Continental jurists have been largely disregarded. For most purposes, this would
be indefensible. To lump Montesquieu (d. 1755) together with Bartolus of Saxoferrato (d.
1357) seems, and in fact is, absurd. However, because the question addressed here is simply
the extent to which American lawyers looked outside the common law for inspiration and
authority, not the extent of difference and development within Continental law itself, this
oversimplification causes relatively little distortion.
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lawyers. The survey demonstrated that more than a few American lawyers knew and made use of the civil law in arguments
offered in courts, and also that American judges cited the same
sources in more than an occasional judicial opinion written
between 1790 and 1825. Although the ultimate importance of
the civil law in the development of American law is a distinct
and more difficult question, Roman law texts and Continental
treatises were clearly used in forensic practice by American lawyers and cited by judges in American opinions. Cases from each
of the fourteen states surveyed contain references to the civil law
and to treatises from within the civilian tradition. Surprisingly,
the list includes states like Kentucky and Tennessee, in which
one might not initially expect classical scholarship to have flourished at so early a date.
No particular geographic tilt appears in the evidence. The
reports of northern states like New Hampshire or Massachusetts
produce citations to the civil law with about the same frequency
as southern states such as South Carolina or Virginia. It is true
that some states produce more usage of civilian sources than
others,18 but there are multiple references to the civil law to be
found within the reports of each of the fourteen states surveyed.
Some lawyers, of whom Joseph Story is probably the prime
example, made more use of the civil law than others. But many
lawyers and judges in every jurisdiction surveyed made some use
of Roman law and Continental treatises. The survey repeatedly
showed that it is incorrect to suppose that civilian usage was an
isolated phenomenon or the peculiarity of a single region. On
the other hand, in no jurisdiction and at no time did usage of the
civil law approach anything even approaching parity with the
common law. Citation of civilian sources was regular, but it was
comparatively infrequent. Continental treatises cited in the
American reports were always vastly outnumbered by English
cases, including those decided both before and after the American Revolution. As time went on, use of authorities drawn from
the civil law was also increasingly overshadowed by references to
American cases, including those from within and without the
particular jurisdiction involved.
The most frequently cited civilian treatises in the early
American reports were those written by seventeenth- and eight18. Vermont and Georgia had the fewest civil-law references of the fourteen states
surveyed.
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eenth-century Continental authors. Research turned up only
one reference to a medieval author on the ius commune, Bartolus de Saxoferrato (d. 1357), and even this isolated instance
seems to have been taken second-hand from a more modem
work. 19 American lawyers made occasional use of sixteenth century treatises; those of Andreas Gail (d. 1587)20 and Benvenuto
Straccia (d. 1578)21 are found in the reports. In total numbers,
however, relatively contemporary writers such as Hugo Grotius
(d. 1645), Samuel Pufendorf (d. 1694), Jean Domat (d. 1696), J.
G. Heineccius (d. 1741), and Robert Pothier (d. 1772) easily
predominated over the older, classic treatise writers from the
civilian tradition.
Within the 1790-1825 period, the variety in kinds of civillaw authorities cited by American lawyers was considerable.
The basic texts of the Roman law-Institutes, Codex, Digest,
and Novels-were frequently cited and commented upon. Also
used, although with considerably less frequency, were standard
commentaries upon those texts, such as the works by Johannes
Voet (d. 1713) or Antonius Perezius (d. 1637). The "Natural
Law School" was well represented in the American reports.
Works by Jean Jacques Burlamaqui (d. 1748), Grotius, and
Pufendorf are the most frequently found. Writers on the law of
nations, such as Vattel (d. 1784), Jean Barbeyrac (d. 1744), and
Cornelius Bynkershoek (d. 1743), also appeared with regularity
in the early American reports. Finally, American lawyers also
used some of the more specialized Continental writers on particular subjects arising in litigation: for example, Ulrich Huber (d.
1694) on conflicts of laws, Cesare Beccaria (d. 1794) on criminal
law, Balthazard Emerigon (d. 1784) on maritime law, and most
often, Robert Pothier on commercial law.
English speaking civilian writers also served as a source of
American knowledge and usage of the European ius commune.
Arthur Browne's Compendious View of the Civil Law (N.Y.,
Halsted & Voorhies 1840), Thomas Rutherford's Institutes of
Natural Law (Cambridge, W. Thurlbourn 1754-56), and
Thomas Wood's New Institutes of the Imperial or Civil Law
19. See Vandenheuvel v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 127, 161 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1801)
(apparently cited from a treatise by Roccus).
20. See State v. Candler, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 393, 398 (1824) (involving the incompetence of a witness previously convicted of forgery in Tennessee).
21. See Williams v. Grant, 1 Conn. 487, 490 & n.(a) (1816) (defining Act of God, but
perhaps cited from Roccus).
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(London, J. Knapton 1730) were probably the most often cited.
The more specialized works of Henry Swinburne (d. 1624) and
John Godolphin (d. 1678) on the law of last wills and testaments
made regular though somewhat less frequent appearances in the
early reports.22 The American entrant into this field was
Thomas Cooper (d. 1839).23 Cooper's Institutes of Justinianwith
Notes (N.Y., Halsted & Voorhies 1841) was the first work to
relate specifically American case law to the civil law. It deserves
to be better known than it is. Judging by the several references
to it found in American cases, Cooper's work met a need felt by
many American lawyers for a repository of information about
the civil law.
As a general matter, when American judges and lawyers
commented on the civilian tradition, they normally did so in
favorable terms, although they were united in recognizing that
the civil law could not have the precedential force of a prior
decision of their state courts or that of an English case. For
instance, a New Jersey judge described the civil law as useful
because it was "founded on the broad basis of immutable reason
and justice. ' 24 Counsel in a Pennsylvania case of 1811, arguing
for adoption of a principle drawn from Roman law, suggested
that it was "clearly a salutary rule; and where there is any color
of authority for the application of the rule, it ought to be
applied." 2 A South Carolina judge similarly spoke of the civil
law as "deeply founded in reason and justice," going on to
describe the Digest of Justinian as "a most valuable mine of judicial knowledge. ' 26 These lawyers evidently admired the civil
law and did not feel constrained about applying it to current
legal problems.
There is, however, another side. These glowing estimates of
the value of civil law were not shared by all American lawyers.
22. For Swinburne, see J.D.M.

DERRETT, HENRY SWINBURNE

(?1551-1624) CIVIL

LAWYER OF YORK (1973). For Godolphin, see DANIEL R. COQUILLETrE, THE CIVILIAN
WRrrERS OF DocroRs' COMMONs, LONDON, 186-89 (1988).
23. See DUMAS MALONE, THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THOMAS COOPER 1783-1839, at 222-

24 (1926).
24. Den v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 197, 203 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1807).
25. Lessee of Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 150, 153-54 (Pa. 1811).
26. State v. Lehre, 7 S.C.L. (2 Tread.) app. at 809, 814 (1811) (quoting Sir William
Jones for the latter); see also Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (1 Wheat) 122, 151 (1819)
(Counsel cited "that great treasury and reservoir of rational jurisprudence, the Roman
law."); Bean v. Smith, 2 F. Cas. 1143, 1153 (C.C.D.R.I. 1821) (No. 1,174) ("[T]he light of
the civil law to guide our inquiries on this subject" of fraudulent conveyances.); Betts v.
Lee, 5 Johns. 348, 350 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) ("The civil law, in its usual wisdom ....
").
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Against them may be set anti-civilian views expressed by other
lawyers: a Kentucky counsel who contrasted the purity of
American institutions with the vice of the Roman system
summed up by the Emperor Caligula,2 7 or the Indiana lawyer
who stigmatized a law from the ius commune as a product of
"the gloomy times of popery, ' 2 or the counsel before the United
States Supreme Court who described Bynkershoek's treatment
of the law of nations as "written in blood."2 9 Quite sophisticated
American lawyers were capable of criticizing basic features of
the civil law. Even Joseph Story, ordinarily an enthusiast for
civilian learning, himself stigmatized the "metaphysical niceties,
and over-curious learning" on conflicts of laws that was to be
found among the writings of some of the civilians.3
Any fair treatment of the issue should therefore recognize
the complexity found in the early American lawyer's attitude
towards the civil law. On the one hand, it contained much that
was useful, fair, and wise. It provided lawyers with an "exhaustless store-house of jurisprudence. ' 31 Many did not hesitate to
use it. On the other hand, the civil law was a system given to
overly elaborate distinctions and contradictory opinions. Some
Americans also regarded the Roman law as a system more compatible with a tyrannical system of government than with the
regime of a free people. The consequence is that disparate opinions about the civil law, both pro and con, appear in the early
American reports.
27. See Elmondortf v. Carmichael, 13 Ky. (3 Litt.) 472, 492 (1823).
28. Fuller v. State, 1 Blackf. 63, 66 (Ind. 1820) (speaking about the law of benefit of
clergy and sanctuary); see also Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) 368, 377
(1821) (Fishly, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that American courts should reject such parts of the
English common law of marriage as were "tainted by canonical mixtures"); Ex pane
M'Clenachan, 2 Yeates 502, 507 (Pa. 1799) (rejecting counsel's argument as one that
"would disgrace the morality of the Jesuits").

29. THE AURORA, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 203, 216 (1814); see also Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns. 57, 62 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818) ("[A] treatise by the hand of a master, but,
like the laws of Draco, it is written in blood.").
30. JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 14, at 19-20 (8th
ed. Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1983) (1834); see also Johnson v. Moore's Heirs, 11 Ky. (1
Lit.) 371, 381 (1822) (criticizing "the senseless jargon of metaphysical disputation" and
refusing to enter into "the respective merits of the varying and conflicting systems of the
schools"); Den v. Vancleve, 5 N.J.L. 589, 632 (N.J. 1819) (containing a contention by
counsel that civilian writers should be rejected because they "exhibit a mass of uncertainty
and confusion"); J.J. Robbins, Memorialfor the Late Mr. JusticeBaldwin (1779-1844), 6
PA. L.J. 1, 11 (1846) (approving his view that "true law for a free and a young country"
should be "'unshackled by the specifications of civilians, untainted by the casuistry of
schoolmen'" (quoting Justice Baldwin)).
31. Mactier v. Frith, 6 Wend. 103, 115 (N.Y. 1830).
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Areas of American Law Making Use of Civilian Sources

In what kinds of cases did references to principles and doctrines found within Continental treatises most commonly
appear? The American reports produce a combination of some
straightforward, expectable usages and some usages of Continental sources that were quite unanticipated. The primary example
of the first consists of maritime disputes, particularly those
involving marine insurance. Dealing with problems of international trade and traditionally falling within admiralty jurisdiction, which was itself based on the civil and international
mercantile law, such cases provided the most natural situations
for citation and application of Continental legal treatises. As a
Massachusetts judge stated in 1825, at least "so far as they may
... be found agreeable" to the common law, the American cases
'32
"stand upon the principles of marine or mercantile law."
Occasionally, usage of Continental law is found in these
maritime cases to the exclusion of common-law rules. For
example, in Brown v. Hartford Insurance Co. ,33 an early Connecticut case, the outcome depended on determining the standard to be used for interpreting the words of an insurance policy,
and the (successful) argument was that the recent, English common-law cases should be rejected in favor of what plaintiff's
counsel described as "the ordinances of almost every commercial nation," in which category he placed the regimes of Spain,
France, Antwerp, Hamburg, and Stockholm.34 Most American
cases, however, stressed the compatibility of common and Continental maritime law, citing the two together. The early reports
of virtually every American state, at least those bordering on the
Atlantic, produce such maritime cases.35 The treatises found
32. Griggs v. Austin, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 20, 22 (1825).

33. 3 Day 58 (Conn. 1808).
34. IaL at 66 (quotation from counsel's argument, accepted in the court's opinion as
also constituting "anciently the law in England," although altered there by more recent

decisions).
35. See THE AURORA, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 96, 109-11 (1816); THE Two CATHER-

INES, 24 F. Cas. 424, 430 (C.C.D.R.I. 1821) (No. 14,288); Hart v. THE LrrTLEjOHN, 11 F.
Cas. 687, 687 (C.C.D. Pa. 1800) (No. 6,153); King v. Middletown Ins. Co., 1 Conn. 184,
202 (1814); Carrere v. Union Ins. Co., 3 H. & J. 324, 328 (Md. 1813); Taggard v. Loring,
16 Mass. 336, 338 (1820); Taylor v. Lowell, 3 Mass. 330, 342-43 (1807); Scott v. Willson, 3
N.H. 321, 324 (1825); Elliott v. Rossell, 10 Johns. 1, 10 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); Hastie &
Patrick v. De Peyster & Charlton, 3 Ca. R. 190, 196 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805); Vandenheuvel
v. United Ins. Co., 2 Johns. Cas. 127, 161-63 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1801); Murray v. Sermon, 8

N.C. (1 Hawks) 56, 58 (1820); Lapsley & Ikin v. Pleasants, 4 Binn. 502, 508-09 (Pa. 1812);
Calhoun v. Insurance Co., 1 Binn. 293, 308 (Pa. 1808); Messonier v. Union Ins. Co., 10
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most often cited in them are those of Emerigon,36 Franciscus
Roccus (d. 1676), 37 Sebastianus Scaccia (fi. 1620), 3 and Rene
Josue Valin (d. 1765), 39 together with that written by an English
judge, Charles Abbott (d. 1832), which was first published in
1802 and which arranged and summed up a great deal of both
Continental and English learning on maritime law.'
Commercial law is the second area where American lawyers made the most consistent use of Continental sources. Cases
dealing with negotiable instruments, the rules of trade, and ordinary principles of agency law referred regularly to Continental
sources for guidance.4 1 This sort of usage is only to be expected.
The civil law on these subjects was considerably more sophisticated than the contemporary common law. Just prior to this
period, Lord Mansfield (d. 1793) had himself attempted to remedy some of the imperfections of the English law by importing
Continental rules relating to commercial transactions. 42 AmeriS.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 155, 160 (1818); Commonwealth v. Gaines, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 172,
181 (1819); see also Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters Samuel
Chase, and the Broken Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw. U. L. REv. 26, 35
(1978) (discussing Richard Peters' use of "the technique of admiralty jurisdiction of picking the best rule for America from a variety of sources").
36. Author of TRArIT DES ASSURANCES ET DES CONTRATS A LA GROSSE (1783),
translated (1811) in the United States as AN ESSAY ON MARITIME LOANS (1911).
37. His work, De navibus et naulo, was translated as A MANUAL OF MARITIME

LAW, and published (1809) in Philadelphia.
38. Author of TRACTATUS DE COMERCIIS ET CAMBIO (1620), a work that was several

times reprinted, but for which I have been unable to find any published English translation.
39. Author of TRArrA DES PRISES OU PRINCIPES DE LA JURISPRUDENCE FRANgOISE
CONCERNANT LES PRISES QUI SE FONT SUR MER (Paris, Chez Merigot 1763).
40. Author of A TREATISE OF THE LAW RELATIVE TO MERCHANT SHIPS AND

SEAMEN (1st ed. James Humpreys 1802).
41. See, eg., M'Hard v. Whetcroft, 3 H. & McH. 85, 89-90 (Md. 1791) (citing Domat
on right of obligor to satisfy bond before due date); Lenox v. Leverett, 10 Mass. 1, 5 n.(a)
(1813) (citing Pothier and Van der Linden on necessity of protest for nonpayment by
holder of bill of exchange); Wright v. Steele, 2 N.H. 51, 53 (1819) (citing the Roman Law
Institutes and Pufendorf in case involving a negotiable instrument executed by a minor);
Chandler v. Herrick, 19 Johns. 129, 133-34 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (citing Pothier on law
relating to novations); Markle v. Hatfield, 2 Johns. 455, 459 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (citing
the Digest and Pothier on effect of payment by a forged negotiable instrument); D'Arcy v.
Lyle, 5 Binn. 441, 446 (Pa. 1813) (citing variety of civilian authors on scope of the law of
agency); Alexander v. Morris, 7 Va. (3 Call) 89, 94 (1801) (citing Domat and Ayliffe's
Pandects in a case dealing with the rights of a factor against his principal). For a fuller
treatment of the general subject, see Daniel R. Coquillette, Legal Ideology and Incorporation IV- The Nature of Civilian Influence on Modern Anglo-American CommercialLaw, 67
B.U. L. REV. 877 (1987).
42. On Mansfield's use of the civil law and the Natural Law School, see J.H. BAKER,
AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 291 (1971); Peter Birks, English and
Roman Learningin Moses v. Macferlan, 37 CURRENT LEGAL PROBS. 1 passim (1984).
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can lawyers did much the same. Indeed, in the American
reports, Mansfield and Pothier seem sometimes almost to have
vied for the attention of American lawyers, the former emerging
only slightly ahead of the latter in general repute.43
Situations in which Continental law was not cited seem
equally straightforward. Questions involving interests in real
property-the stuff of our law of estates in land-did not normally call for either argument or decision taken from the civil
law. Questions of dower and curtesy, not to speak of the elaborate rules relating to contingent remainders and executory interests, required reference to common-law cases to the exclusion of
authorities drawn from the civil law.44 These were peculiarly
English legal concepts. Although some of them had Continental
parallels, the parallels were distant enough so that it would have
been the comparativist rather than the practicing lawyer who
would need or wish to draw upon them, and that is not the sort
of need or desire that led to appearance in the case law.
Equally expectable and understandable is the dearth of
civil-law citation in cases involving rules of pleading. Among
the most arcane and highly developed elements of the common
law, precedents on points of pleading both filled contemporary
English reports and spawned a considerable treatise literature. 45
They were repeatedly cited, though not uniformly followed, by
American lawyers. Close parallels with Roman law, and any
particular need for having recourse to Roman law, were lacking
in this comer of the law. Pleading should, of course, be distinguished on this score from the law of civil and criminal procedure, in which important principles of justice could be at stake
and in which civil law was in fact sometimes cited.46 Within its
43. See, eg., Peele v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 19 F. Cas. 98, 102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822)
(No. 10,905) (Story, J.) (favoring Lord Mansfield's approach); see also Peter C. Hoffer,
PrincipledDiscretion:Concealment, Conscience,and Chancellors, 3 YALE J.L. & HUMANI-

TIES 53, 72-75 (1991). High opinions of Pothier's authority on commercial law questions
are also found in English reports of this era. See, e.g., Cox v. Troy, 106 Eng. Rep. 1264,
1266 (K.B. 1822).
44. See, for example, the sentiments expressed in connection with the rule in Shelley's
Case in Lyle v. Richards, 9 Serg. & Rawl. 322, 365 (Pa. 1823) (rejecting proposed application of the maxim "that nothing is law, that is not reason").
45. The period under discussion in fact coincided with renewed attention to the subject in England, culminating in HENRY J. STEPHEN, TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF
PLEADING (2d ed. Phil., R.H. Small 1831). See generally 13 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 458-60 (A.L. Goodhart & H.G. Hanbury eds., 1952).
46. See infra note 61.
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technical sphere, pleading nonetheless remained a common-law
monopoly in the American courts.
Two areas of the law which at first sight seem to have been
likely candidates for using Continental works, the law of slavery
and the law relating to church government, also produced surprisingly little evidence of the application of civil law. There
were many reported cases on both these subjects in the early
American reports. However, fewer of them refer to Continental
sources than might be expected. Slavery was not, of course, a
living institution in Continental Europe in the early 1800s, as it
was in the United States, but the Roman law itself was full of it,
and the institution of slavery was commonly treated by writers
on natural law. 47 Except for the State of South Carolina, however, and to a somewhat lesser extent the Commonwealth of Virginia," American decisions produce relatively few examples of
lawyers or judges referring explicitly to the Roman law on the
subject.4 9
The explanation for this absence is not immediately apparent in the reports. There, of course, would have been a natural
unwillingness to use civilian doctrines in the northern states.
The moral ambiguity surrounding the institution may explain
the absence of citation in the North to the Roman law, which
had sanctioned it. Even in states where slavery existed, thoughtful men doubted its legitimacy and may have hesitated to
embrace civilian doctrines on that account."0 Moreover, the
widespread adoption of express legislation on the subject in
47. See generally ALAN WATSON, SLAVE LAW IN THE AMERICAS (1989). My findings on this point are not identical to those of Professor Watson. See id. at 65 (finding it a
common practice to turn to Roman law for guidance). His study extends to the period
after 1825, and perhaps this may account for part of the difference.
48. See Bull v. Horlbeck, 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 301, 302 (1793) (reporting a statement by
counsel that because slavery was unknown in England, "[e]very rule, therefore, respecting
slaves, must be taken from the civil law," or else derived from local custom); see also
Wingis v. Smith, 15 S.C.L. (3 McCord) 400, 402 (1825); Milledge v. Lamar, 4 S.C. Eq. (4
Des.) 617, 640 (1816); Bynum v. Bostick, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 266, 267 (1812). For Virginia
cases, see Bryson, supra note 13, at 142-44.
49. There are only occasional exceptions, mostly in which natural law principles were
invoked to restrict the rights of slaveowners. See, e.g., Mahoney v. Ashton, 4 H. & McH.
295, 297, 300 (Md. 1799) (Grotius, Bynkershoek, Pufendorf, and Rutherford cited by counsel for plaintiff in petition of freedom, arguing that enslavement of Africans was incompatible with all justifications for slavery found in these works).
50. See Almeida v. Certain Slaves, 1 F. Cas. 538, 539-40 (C.C.D.S.C. 1814) (No. 255)
(holding that slaves were not to be treated as property for purposes of prize law because
that could not have been the intention of Congress). For a typical judicial expression in a
northern state, see, for example, Cook v. Neaff, 3 Yeates 259, 260 (Pa. 1801) ("Colour or
complexion cannot effect a difference in the great essentials of justice.").
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southern states would equally have lessened the occasion to look
to the civil law for aid in cases involving slavery. It, nonetheless,
must be confessed that these explanations seem only partial,
although no other is suggested by the cases. The fact of the
absence of frequent Roman law citation, unfortunately, seems
clearer than its explanation.
The almost complete absence of civilian citation in cases
relating to ecclesiastical governance and property is only slightly
easier to explain.5 1 There is some evidence to suggest that antiCatholic views on the part of American jurists lay behind their
reluctance to cite Continental writers on ecclesiastical questions. 2 There were Protestant writers on this subject on the
Continent, however, so that religious feelings do not furnish a
complete explanation. It seems just as likely that the nature of
the common law played a determinative role here. English law
had long treated most questions relating to ecclesiastical property as belonging to the secular courts. 3 Doctrines drawn from
the law of real property, not the canon law, furnished the primary rules of decision. Doctrines imported from the Continent
were therefore mostly out of place in England, and this pattern
was repeated in the United States. 4 It is also likely that the
issues in some of the American cases, involving conflicting
claims between the several religious denominations within the
51. See, e.g., Mason v. Muncaster, 16 F. Cas. 1048 (C.C.D.D.C. 1821) (No. 9,247)
(citing no civil or canon law in case involving rights in land formerly held by a parish of the
Church of England); United States v. McCormick, I D.C. ( Cranch) 593, 597-98 (1809)
(defining the word "clerk" without reference to original canon law); Commonwealth v.
Spooner, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 235, 241 (1822) (defining the term "ordination" exclusively
from American cases and statutes); Van Vechten v. Paddock, 12 Johns. 178, 178 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1815) (mentioning canon law in case involving delivery of writ on Sunday, but not
directly applied).
52. See, e.g., Baker v. Fales, 16 Mass. 488, 517 (1820) (effect of schism within a Congregational parish, stressing the "free principles which laid the foundation" for religious
life in New England); In re Corporation of St. Mary's Church, 7 Serg. & Rawl. 517, 539-40
(Pa. 1822) (suggesting that it was "scarcely possible that the Roman Catholics of the
United States of America should not imbibe some of that spirit of religious freedom which
is diffused throughout the country"); see also 1 JoHN ADAMs, Dissertation on the Canon
and the FeudalLaw, in PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 114 (Robert J. Taylor et al. eds., 1977)
(American polity established "in direct opposition to the cannon and the feudal systems"
(emphasis added)).
53. See generally W.R. Jones, Relations of the Two Jurisdictions:Conflict and Cooperation in England Duringthe Thirteenth andFourteenth Centuries,in 7 STUDIES IN MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE HisTORy 77, 102-04 (William M. Bowsky ed., 1970).
54. Some slight reference to Continental works is found in Turpin v. Locket, 10 Va.
(6 Call) 113, 119-20 (1804) (questioning constitutionality of a statute ordering glebe lands
to be sold for the benefit of the poor).
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same area, happened so much less often in Europe that the Continental treatises would inevitably have been of lesser value. As
a consequence, American lawyers seem almost consciously to
have wished to "start over" in establishing rules for many parts
of the ecclesiastical law applied in the United States.
When one moves beyond these relatively clear-cut areas of
inclusion and exclusion, firm lines are less easily drawn. Civillaw sources were employed here and there in a great variety of
the cases heard by the American courts before 1825. Roman
and canon law were cited on questions involving the law of evidence,55 in disputes over real5 6 and personal property, 57 in cases
involving procedural rules,58 in questions relating to the law of
agency and partnership,5 9 in pleas raising the statute of limita55. See, e.g., Spurr v. Pearson, 22 F. Cas. 1011, 1012-14 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No.
13,268) (citing a wide variety of civilian sources on competency of witnesses); Townsend v.
Bush, 1 Conn. 259, 267-69 (1814) (discussing and finally rejecting application of Romanlaw maxim related to impeaching a negotiable instrument); Mahoney v. Ashton, 4 H. &
McH. 295, 297, 300-02 (Md. 1799) (citing Bynkershoek, Grotius, Pufendorf, and Rutherford on whether a special verdict from prior trial could be put in evidence before a jury);
Lessee of Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 150, 153-54 (Pa. 1811) (citing Roman law on whether
testimony ofjurors could be admitted to show their own misconduct); Taylor v. Beck, 24
Va. (3 Rand.) 316, 345 (1825) (citing the civil law on question of whether endorser of a
negotiable instrument was a competent witness in suit alleging note was usurious).
56. See, e.g., Doe v. Morrell, Smith Rep. 255, 257 (N.H. 1807) (action for trespass);
see also Atherton v. Johnson, 2 N.H. 31, 34 (1819) (citing Justinian's Institutes on character of adverse possession of land); Tucker v. White, 1 N.J.L. 111, 117, 119 (N.J. 1791)
(citing Grotius, Barbeyrac, and Vattel on question of rights accruing from possession of an
island in Delaware River); Jackson v. White, 20 Johns. 313, 322 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822)
(citing Pufendorf and Vattel in ejectment action involving property held by alien); Biggus v.
Bradly, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 500, 502 (1821) (citing Domat and the French Civil Code on
question involving warranty of title).
57. See, eg., Woodbridge & Co. v. Perkins, 3 Day 364, 373 (Conn. 1809) (citing
Domat on transfer of incorporeal rights); Jarvis v. Rogers, 15 Mass. 389, 406-07 (1819)
(citing Roman-law Codex and Digest, Heineccius, and Huber on rights of pledgees); Odiorne v. Colley, 2 N.H. 66, 70 (1819) (citing Pothier in trover action involving sheriff's
power to transfer good title); Betts & Church v. Lee, 5 Johns. 348, 349-50 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1810) (citing Vinnius and the Digest on law of accession involving timber). But cf Seymour v. Brown, 19 Johns. 44, 47 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1821) (citing, but rejecting, Roman-law
texts and Bynkershoek on the law of bailments).
58. See, eg., Nicholls v. Hodge, 18 F. Cas. 180, 181 (C.C.D.D.C. 1825) (No. 10,231)
(citing Francis Clerke's _Praxiscuriaeadmiralitatison question of scope of review on appeal
from Orphan's Court); Jones v. Henry, 13 Ky. (3 Litt.) 427, 431 (1823) (citing Pothier to
the effect that actions involving principal and surety do not fall within the scope of the rule
res inter alios acta); Houghton v. Page, 2 N.H. 41, 47 (1819) (citing Vattel on special character of penal statutes).
59. See, e-g., Boardman v. Gore, 15 Mass. 331, 333 (1818) (Voet was cited by counsel
on the question of extent of one partner's power to bind the other.); Jessup v. Cook, 6
N.J.L. 434, 441 (1798) (Puffendorf was cited by counsel in question involving apportionment of loss between partners.); D'Arcy v. Lyle, 5 Binn. 441, 450 (Pa. 1813) (Heineccius
was cited in action by agent against principal.).
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tions, 60 in criminal prosecutions, 6' in disputes about principles of
statutory construction, 62 on questions relating to the law of damages, 6 3 and in many probate matters."

Cases dealing with ques-

60. See, e.g., Sheftall v. Clay, R. M. Chariton Rep. 7, 9 (Ga. 1811) (citing Pothier in
justification for suspending running of statute in debt claim); Troup v. Smith, 20 Johns. 33,
38 (N.Y. 1822) (citing Domat and Vattel for proposition that statute should not be used to
reward fraudulent conduct); Richards v. Bickley, 13 Serg. & Rawle 395, 399-400 (Pa.
1825) (employing civilian categories of contract to interpret statute of limitations);
Gourdine v. Graham, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 329, 330 (1804) (citing Pothier for principle of
applicability of statute in trover for conversion of a slave).
61. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 163 n.(a) (1820) (citing a
number of civil-law writers on definition of piracy); THE EMULOUS, 8 F. Cas. 697, 702 n.8
(C.C.D. Mass. 1813) (No. 4,479) (citing Grotius on the confiscation of criminal's property);
In re J.V.N. Yates, 4 Johns. 317, 375 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (citing Montesquieu on power of
judiciary and necessity of judicial discretion); Respublica v. Gibbs, 3 Yeates 429, 432 (Pa.
1802) (finding the argument that requiring a voter to answer possibly incriminating questions was "against the very law of nature"); Respublica v. Roberts, 1 Yeates 6, 6-7 (Pa.
1791) (defining adultery in part according to Roman law); State v. Lehre, 7 S.C.L. (2
Tread.) 809, 814 (1811) (citing Domat and Roman-law texts in criminal prosecution for
libel); State v. Hobbs & Strong, 2 Tyl. 380, 381 (Vt. 1803) (citing Beccaria in prosecution of
official for torturing suspect). Also suggestive is Mitchell Franklin, Romanist Infamy and
the American Constitutional Conception of Impeachment, 23 BuFF. L. REv. 313 passim
(1974).
62. See, e.g., Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228, 233 (1824) (applying the civil law and text
from Codex to Connecticut statute of descent and distribution regarding rights of illegitimate children); Callender v. Marsh, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 410, 423, 429 (1823) (citing the
Roman-law Digest, Heineccius, Pothier, and Jacobus Facciolatus in interpreting the word
"repair"); Simpson v. Coe, 3 N.H. 85, 87 (1824) (citing Vattel for meaning of word "resident"); Den v. Urison, 2 N.J.L. 212, 218 (1807) (citing inter alia Roman law as stated by
Cicero and laws of Bologna in favor of giving liberal construction to statute); Respublica v.
Richards, 1 Yeates 480, 483 (Pa. 1795) (ridiculing mechanical construction of statute by
citing story from Pufendorf); Murray v. M'Carty, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 393, 397 n.(a) (Va.
1811) (invoking Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and Heineccius in interpreting act regulating
the importation of slaves).
63. See, e.g., Emerson v. Howland, 8 Fed. Cas. 634, 636 (C.C.D. Mass. 1816) (No.
4,441) (citing Pothier, Domat, and Valin on proper measure of damages for mariner dismissed wrongfully); Morris v. Phelps, 5 Johns. 49, 56-57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809) (citing the
Roman-law Digest and Pothier on apportionment of damages where title failed as to only
part of land conveyed); Joyce v. Sims, 1 Yeates 409, 410 (Pa. 1795) (Emerigon cited by
both parties on availability of consequential damages in assumpsit); Davis v. Executors of
Richardson, 1 S.C.L. 43, 43 (1 Bay) 105, 106 (1790) (citing Domat on question of proper
time for valuing property subject of loss in contract action); see also Green v. Biddle, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 79-80 (1823).
64. See, e.g., Penfield v. Savage, 2 Conn. 386, 388 (1818) (defining statutory guardianship in light of cura and tutela from Roman law); Griffin v. Executors of Griffin, R.M.
Charlton Rep. 217, 227 (Ga. 1822) (citing Justinian's Institutes in dispute over standards of
testamentary capacity); Erickson v. Willard, I N.H. 217, 230 (1818) (employing Vattel in
construing precatory language in a will); Jackson v. White, 8 Johns. 59, 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1811) (Swinbume cited by counsel in case involving interpretation of words of a devise of
land); Fox v. Wilcocks, 1 Binn. 194, 197 (Pa. 1806) (discussing argument from Denizart
and Pothier on liability of personal representative for failure to invest decedent's assets
properly); Legare v. Ashe, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 187, 187 (1795) (citing Swinburue and Bum on
court's ability to probate a lost will).
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tions of fundamental and constitutional law also frequently
called for citation of principles and authorities drawn from Continental law.6 5 More will be said below about the variety of purposes for which civilian authorities were employed in such cases,
but as an initial matter, it is well to emphasize the great variety
of cases in which the civil law appeared. The kinds of early
American cases in which the reports do not contain references to
civilian sources turn out to be easier to summarize overall than
those that do.
III.

FUNCTIONS OF THE CIVIL LAW

When and for what specific purposes did American lawyers
and judges most often resort to the civil law? This section examines this question in detail, looking at the patterns of usage made
of foreign materials and asking what the results reveal about the
habits of mind of the lawyers of the new Republic. Essentially
three answers to this question-some expectable, some notemerge from a systematic examination of the reports. First, the
civil law was introduced where the English common law was
considered nonexistent, inconclusive, or wrong. Second, civilian
writers were cited where fundamental principles of justice were
at stake. Third (and initially most puzzling), the civil law was
used where it was identical with the common law, but where the
English cases were thought to need buttressing by reference to
rules drawn from outside its boundaries.
A.

Deficiencies in English Common Law

The first of the three-deficiencies in the common law-is
the most obvious, although the line between cases -where there
was no common law at all and those where the common law was
thought either unacceptable or insufficiently clear turns out to be
difficult to draw. It is certain, nonetheless, that real gaps in the
English law were perceived by American lawyers, and that these
lawyers sometimes used Continental law to fill the gaps. As a
South Carolina judge described one such instance, "[t]he case
was considered so new and without precedent, that the counsel
resorted in
their arguments to the authors of foreign
66
countries."

The best known example of "gap perception" is the old
65. See infra text accompanying notes 99-118.
66. HENRY W. DESAUSSURE, Introduction to

REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND
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chestnut of the basic, law school property course, Pierson v.
In Pierson, the question was how a hunter acquired
property rights in a wild animal, and for an answer to the question Judge Tompkins found reason to turn to Justinian's Institutes and to treatises by Grotius, Pufendorf and his annotator
Barbeyrac, as well as to the medieval English "Romanizers,"
Bracton and Fleta. Professor Donahue has argued that the case
could have been decided out of the common law alone.68 This is
doubtless correct, but this was not how the New York judge
stated that he himself perceived the matter. His opinion stated
that the English cases had all arisen either under particular statutes, or in disputes between hunters and the owners of land
where the animal was taken, and that "little satisfactory aid
[could], therefore, be derived from the English reporters."6 9 It
was in just such circumstances that American judges commonly
chose to resort to Continental authorities for answering immediate questions of law.
Pierson v. Post does not stand alone. Civilian texts and
commentators defining and explaining ownership by occupancy
of wild animals also appear in early decisions from New Hampshire,70 New Jersey,7 ' and Pennsylvania.72 Moreover, the sentiments found in Judge Tompkins' opinion were matched in a
wide variety of American decisions.73 Other questions of law on
which American lawyers regarded common-law sources insufficient, and had recourse to civil-law traditions in consequence,
Post.67

DETERMINED IN THE COURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA XXiX

(West Publishing Co. 1917) (1817).
67. 3 Cai. R. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805). Its use of civil-law authority is fairly
described as, "one very outmoded characteristic of the opinion," in A. JAMES CASNER &
W. BARTON LEACH, CASES AND TEXT ON PROPERTY 15, 62 (1st ed. 1950).
68. Charles Donahue, Jr., Animalia Ferae Naturae:Rome, Bologna, Leyden, Oxford
and Queen's County, N.Y., in STUDIES IN ROMAN LAW IN MEMORY OF A. ARTHUR
SCHILLER 39, 57 (Roger S. Bagnall & William V. Harris eds., 1986).
69. Pierson, 3 Cai. R. at 177.
70. See, eg., Fisher v. Steward, Smith Rep. 60, 61 (N.H. 1804) (trespass for the taking of a swarm of bees).
71. See, eg., Arnold v. Mundy, 6 N.J.L. 1, 71 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1821) (citing Vattel to
show "transient usufructuary possession" appropriate for fish); Shepard & Layton v. Leverson, 2 N.J.L. 391, 394 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1808) (citing Domat in trover action for taking oysters
in a navigable stream); see also Tucker v. White, 1 N.J.L. 111, 117 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1791)
(where defendant's counsel argued that the rights to an island in the Delaware River were
"scarcely referable to the municipal law of any particular country .... but [that] we should
refer to the law of nature, as in many other cases.").
72. See, eg., Wallis v. Mease, 3 Binn. 546, 552-53 (Pa. 1811) (slander for imputation
of the theft of bees).
73. See infra notes 74-77.
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included: determining rights inter se of two owners who held in
severalty a house of which one had precipitously demolished his
own half,74 fixing correct rules for the abatement of legacies,"
deciding if and under what circumstances jurors should be
admitted to impeach their own verdict, 76 and sorting out a difficult procedural question involving what would later be called
collateral estoppel. 7 The judges who decided these cases treated
them as matters of first impression. In much the same fashion
that Sir William Jones had turned to civilian learning to formulate the law of bailments when English law on the subject was
wanting,7" American lawyers had recourse to Continental
sources in cases that came before them when they believed the
common law was insufficient. 79 No doubt they could have made
more creative use of the common-law precedents, but the fact is
that they did not believe themselves obliged to do so. Apparently they did not think that limiting themselves to English common-law precedents would have been sensible where the
precedents would have required stretching.
The law of conflicts provides the most frequently found
example of "gap perception" in the pre-1825 American reports.
Justice Story, our first and most influential writer on the subject,
was an admirer of the civil law. He read widely within its traditions. Story himself saw no incongruity in resorting to civilian
sources in conflicts cases, because he believed that the common
law itself had long been aligned with the Continental law on the
subject. His professed aim in dealing with the law of conflicts
74. See Doe v. Morrell, Smith Rep. 255, 257 (N.H. 1809) (Judge Smith citing Domat
after noting, "I have taken some pains to examine the books in relation to this case,... but
have not met with much success.").
75. See Nash v. Nash, 2 N.C. (1 Hayw.) 228, 232 (1795) (Judge Haywood remarked:
"These books [referring to the works of Swinburne and Godolphin], it must be admitted,
are not of the best authority, . . . yet as the rule laid down by them is so equitable in itself,
and has not been contradicted by any adjudged case, it seems fit to be adopted in the
present case...."); see also Delaplaine v. Jones & Searing, 8 N.J.L. 340, 349 (N.J. Sup. Ct.
1826) (attempting to turn to the civil law in an inheritance dispute when the judge had "not
found any reported decision which [could] aid [him] in [his] enquiry.").
76. See Lessee of Cluggage v. Swan, 4 Binn. 150, 153-54 (Pa. 1811).
77. See Boardman v. DeForest, 5 Conn. 1, 10 (1823) (citing only Pothier's treatise on
obligations).
78. See WILLIAM JONES, AN ESSAY ON THE LAW OF BAILMENTS (Ist ed. 1781).
79. For an American example referring to the law of bailments, see Burrows v.
Reeves, 10 S.C.L. (I Nott & McC.) 427, 428 (1819).
80. See R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY 297 (1985)
("[Nothing sort of prodigious" and including the works of no fewer than forty-seven commentators.); see also Roscoe Pound, The Place of Judge Story in the Making of American
Law, 48 AM. L. REv. 676, 693-94 (1914).
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was "to use the works of the civilians, to illustrate, confirm, and
expand the doctrines of the common law."'" He did that and
more, expounding a variety of rules and expressions drawn from
the civil law which he found had also been "incorporated into
the very substance of the jurisprudence" of the new American
states.8 2 It is, of course, wrong to oversimplify. Story used
many English and American cases, and he was quite capable 8of3
criticizing the "over curious learning" of Continental authors.
He drew selectively from civilian fonts, but he drew from them
constantly.
Story's use of civilian treatises is mirrored in many early
conflicts decisions from the pens of other American judges.8 4 In
an 1803 case, for example, suit had been brought in New York
to enforce a promissory note barred by the statute of limitations
of that state but not by that of Connecticut, where the note had
been executed. 5 The court invoked the authority of Huber and
Emerigon to hold that the courts of one state did "not derogate
from their [own] dignity by enforcing the laws of the state where
the contract originated. 8' 6 In a North Carolina case of 1801,
involving a choice of law problem in the law of intestate succession, the judge similarly decided the case according to the "principle of the law of nations," citing Vattel's Law of Nations along
with English authorities that had adopted the same rule. 7 The
81. STORY, supra note 30, § 16, at 26. For representative comment on Story's use of
civilian learning, particularly Ulric Huber (d. 1694), see ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL.,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 3 (2d ed. 1975), and WILLIS L.M. REESE & MAURICE ROSENBERG,
CONFLICT OF LAWS 4 (7th ed. 1978). As a judge, Story made frequent use of conflicts
principles taken from the ius gentium. See, e.g., Van Reimsdyk v. Kane, 28 F. Cas. 1062,
1065 (C.C.D.R.I. 1812) (No. 16,871).
82. STORY, supra note 30, § 16, at 26.
83. Id § 14, at 19.
84. Citation to foreign authors on conflicts questions by American judges clearly
antedated Story's Commentaries, which were first published in 1834. See Samuel
Livermore, Conflict of Law, 2 AM. JURIST 214 passim (1829); Kurt H. Nadelmann, Comment, Joseph Story's Contributionto American Conflicts Law, 5 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 230,
231-32 (1961). For an earlier English example of the same kind of usage, see Hunter v.
Potts, 100 Eng. Rep. 962, 963 (K.B. 1791). I agree with Nadelmann that it is a mistake to
see Story's work as a "complete break" with prior writing on conflicts, as had been suggested by ERNEST G. LORENZEN, Story's Commentaries on the Conflict of Laws-One
Hundred Years After, in SELECTED ARTICLES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, 181, 193
(1947). See also Bruce Wardhaugh, From NaturalLaw to Legal Realism: Legal Philosophy,
Legal Theory, and the Development of American Conflict of Laws Since 1830, 41 ME. L.
REv. 307, 308-21 (1989); Hessel E. Yntema, The Comity Doctrine, 65 MICH. L. REv. 9, 31
(1966).
85. See Nash v. Tupper, 1 Cai. R. 402, 415 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1803).

86. Id.
87. See Williamson's Adm'rs v. Smart, 1 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 355, 361 (1801).
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law's purpose, he wrote, was "to cherish a spirit of friendly intercourse amongst their respective citizens." 8 For this purpose,
principles drawn from the law of nations seemed helpful, indeed
all but required. In the law of conflicts, American lawyers
repeatedly turned to Continental sources when they could not
find the answers they needed either fully or adequately stated in
the English cases.8 9
Areas of legal practice in which sufficient English law did
not exist do not, however, exhaust this subject. The early American reports also contain cases in which the English common law
was clearly established, but was nonetheless ignored in favor of a
rule drawn from the civil law. The clearest example comes from
South Carolina. The courts there regularly rejected the common-law rule that no implied warranty of quality existed in the
sale of goods. This state, as one judge put it, "will ever continue
to be governed by the Civil Law maxim, 'that a sound price
88. Id.at 362; see also Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 219 n.(a)
(1818) (Justice Todd noted: "The foundations of this doctrine, and of all the other principles concerning the lex loci, are laid down by Huberus, in his Praelectiones,with that admirable force and precision which distinguish the works of the writers who have been formed
in the school of the Roman jurisconsults ...."); Banks v. Greenleaf, 2 F. Cas. 756, 757
(C.C.D. Va. 1799) (No. 959) (Judge Washington opening his opinion, "The principles laid
down by Huberus, and universally acknowledged, are ...."); Woodbridge v. Wright, 3
Conn. 523, 526 (1821) (quoting Huber and Emerigon on when the lexfori governs enforcement of contractual obligations); Rankin v. Lydia, 9 Ky. (2 A.K. Marsh.) 467, 477 (1820)
(citing Vattel as authority for necessity of comity in case involving seven-year residence by
a slave in free territory); Pearsall v. Dwight, 2 Mass. 84, 90 (1806) (applying the rationale
from Huber's Praelectiones, and observing that "no authorities in point have been cited
from our books, nor do I recollect any."); Bryant v. Ea, Smith Rep. 396, 401 (N.H. 1815)
("The law of nations forms a part of the law of Vermont, and of this State, and every
independent State."); Gibbons v. Livingston, 6 N.J.L. 236, 283 (N.J. 1822) (employing
Vattel to interpret statute involving constitutional relations between New York and New
Jersey); Smith v. Smith, 2 Johns. 235, 241 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1807) (citing inter alia the work
of Huber and applying the "reasoning of all the elementary writers, and the decisions of
courts of justice"); Desesbats v. Berquier, I Binn. 336, 347 (Pa. 1808) (citing and defending
the opinions of Vattel, Huber, Wolfe, and other civilians on conflicts questions involving
succession to moveables). But cf Respublica v. Gaoler of Philadelphia, 2 Yeates 263, 264
(Pa. 1798) (distinguishing counsel's citation of Vattel as applicable "merely to nations
entirely independent on [sic] each other"); Vaughan v. Phebe, 8 Tenn. (Mart. & Yer.) 4, 24
(1827) (citing Vattel in slavery case for the rule lex loci rei sitae); Lewis v. Fullerson, 22 Va.
(1 Rand.) 15, 24 (1821) (citing Huber in justification for denying validity to deed of emancipation executed in Ohio).
89. On this inadequacy, see WILLIAM E. NELSON, The American Revolution and the
Emergence of Modern Doctrinesof Federalismand Conflict ofLaws, in LAW IN COLONIAL
MASSACHUSETTS, 1630-1800, at 419 (David R. Coquillette et al. eds., Colonial Soc'y of
Mass. vol. 62, 1984). The perception, explained in Nelson's article, is illustrated in State v.
Chandler, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 393, 401 (1824) (Henderson, J.)
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requires a sound commodity.' "90 He rejoiced that the citizens of
his young state were not yet so "hackneyed in arts of deception
and fraud" that they would embrace the degenerate regime of
caveat emptor in force under English law.9 1
Similar instances are to be found in the reports of other
states. A few American jurisdictions equally flirted with the
civilian rule about implied warranties involving the sale of
goods, 92 and rejection of inherited common-law rules also
occurred in other areas of the law. In 1825, for example, the
Supreme Court of New Hampshire rejected a line of English
cases that permitted enforcement of wagering contracts,
expressly adopting instead civil-law authority holding against
actionability on the grounds of public policy. 93 "The better part
of the community here," the judge wrote, "would regret" adoption of the common law on this subject. 94 In a Connecticut case
decided the year before, the supreme court of that state similarly
refused to give a reading based on English law to its own statute
of descent and distribution." The court preferred instead the
90. Barnard v. Yates, 10 S.C.L. (I Nott & MeC.) 142, 145 (1818). In Nelson v.
Emerson, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 48 (1802), the court held, "[O]ur courts of Justice are not
bound by the decisions of the English Courts, farther than they may comport with the
general principles of law and the genius and policy of our government." Id at 49. For
Roman law on the subject, see REInHARD ZIMMERMAN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS:
ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 334 (1990), and F. DE ZULUETA,
THE ROMAN LAW OF SALE 46-51 (1945).
91. Barnard, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) at 150; see also Stinson v. Bowlware, 15
S.C.L. (3 McCord) 251, 254 (1825); Vandehost & Co. v. Mactaggart, 3 S.C.L. (I Brev.)
269, 271 (1803); Parker v. Kennedy, 1 S.C.L. (1 Bay) 160, 173 (1795). But compare the
only slightly veiled criticism of the civil-law rule in Biggus v. Bradly, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord)
500, 501 (1821) (describing South Carolina's adoption of the "more dangerous, if more
inviting maxim of the civil law"), and Ware v. Weathnall, 13 S.C.L. (2 McCord) 413, 414
(1823) (rejecting the principle, at least in dictum). For an interesting and instructive parallel, albeit with a different result, see M.H. Hoeffich, Laidlaw v. Organ, Gulian C Verplanck and the Shaping of Early Nineteenth Century ContractLaw: A Tale of a Case and a
Commentary, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 55.
92. See Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day 163, 189 (Conn. 1805); Baring v. Reeder, 11 Va. (1
Hen. & M.) 154, 161-63 (1806); see also Jollife v. Hite, 5 Va. (1 Call) 301, 316-17 (1798)
(citing Grotius, Domat, and Pufendorf to the same effect in a land plea, although at least
the first was probably taken from an English case). But cf Wilson v. Schackleford, 25 Va.
(4 Rand.) 5, 7 (1826) (rejecting civil law in favor of English law on the subject).
93. See Perkins v. Eaton, 3 N.H. 152, 155 (1825) (citing THOMAS WOOD, A NEW
INSTIruTE OF THE IMPERIAL OR CIVIL LAW 218 (London, Knapton 1730) for the applicable civil law on the subject). Most other American jurisdictions, of course, followed the
common law on the subject. See, eg., Seixas & Seixas v. Woods, 2 Cai. R. 48, 52-56 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1804); Shepherd v. Sawyer, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 26, 27 (1811).
94. Perkins, 3 N.H. at 155.
95. Heath v. White, 5 Conn. 228, 234 (1824).
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civil-law rule as "agreeable to the law of nature and reason. 96
The judge added, "I cannot admit any influence on my opinion
law of England, which never has been
from the common
97
adopted here."

The absolute frequency of such decisions rejecting the common-law in favor of a civil-law rule should not be exaggerated.
They were the exception. Against them stand others in which
counsel argued that a civil-law rule should be adopted, only to
meet with judicial rebuff. "[W]hatever may be the decisions of
the civil law," wrote Chancellor Kent after hearing an argument
based partly on the Roman-law Digest and Codex and on the
Commentaries of Jean Domat, "we must decide this question by
the common law of England." 98 The cases making explicit use
of the civil law do, nevertheless, stand as a reminder that American judges faced a real choice of whether or not to "receive" the
English common law. Mostly they did receive it. 99 But this
result was by no means a foregone conclusion, and as these
examples show, in circumstances where American judges found
the common law unsuitable to conditions in the new land or
contrary to principles of utility or fairness, the civil law and the
learning that went along with it presented them with a lively
alternative.
96. Id (quoting Canaan v. Salisbury, 1 Root 155, 156 (Conn. 1790)).
97. Id at 235; see also M'Coul v. Lekamp's Adm'x, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 111, 117-18
(1817) (discussion of admission in evidence of a merchant's books of account, contrasting
civilian practice as shown by Pothier with its general inadmissibility under English common law and approving of inroads in latter rule); McClain v. Hayne, 6 S.C.L. (I Tread.)
212, 227 (1812) ("Many of the principles of our decisions are drawn from the civil law, and
are confessedly contrary to the decisions of the English courts."); Miller v. Beverleys, 14
Va. (4 Hen. & M.) 415, 419 (1809) (rejecting English common-law decisions "which do not
conform to the standard of that justice, which commands us to live honestly, hurt nobody,
and render every one his due." (emphasis added)).
98. Frost v. Raymond, 2 Cai. R. 188, 191 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. 1804); see also Martin v.
Brown, 7 N.J.L. 305, 333 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1799) ("The opinions of public jurists can have but
a remote bearing upon a question which is to be governed wholly by our own municipal
laws ....");Jackson v. Marshall, 5 N.C. (1 Mur.) 323, 329-30 (1809) (A claim "will derive
very little weight from the consideration that it would have been enforced by a Roman
Praetor," if it turned out to be opposed to rules "that have grown out of the condition and
positive institutions of the country."); Commonwealth v. Walker's Executor, 11 Va. (1
Hen. & M.) 144, 149 (1806) (John Randolph remarking in argument as counsel, "Grotius
and Puffendorfhave been quoted, as if this question was now before the Legislature. This is
not the first time. .. ").
99. See the discussion in Fitch v. Brainerd, 2 Day 186, 189 (Conn. 1805) (English
common law has "as such, nor ever had, any force here yet, . . . it long since became
necessary, in order to avoid arbitrary decisions, and for the sake of rules, which habit had
rendered familiar, as well as the wisdom of ages matured, to make that law our own....
(emphasis added)).
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Fundamentaland ConstitutionalPrinciples of Law

Natural law and the ius gentium had much to say about
fundamental legal principles, and the evidence of the early
American reports shows that some of what they said was found
relevant and useful by American lawyers. A voluminous treatise
literature grew up on the Continent around these twin sources of
juristic speculation. Writers like Hugo Grotius or Samuel
Pufendorf, men whose names are still known to educated lawyers, developed elaborate and sophisticated legal systems from
the tenets of natural law, and one can speak of the existence of a
"Natural Law School" during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. From the vast treatise literature spawned by this
School, judges and counsel in the American Republic drew in
appropriate cases. Where questions about basic principles of
government were raised in litigation, many lawyers did not hesitate to refer to civilian authority. 100
Some of this ground has already been explored. Reference
by American lawyers to Continental sources has been demonstrated by scholars pursuing the "higher law" background to the
United States Constitution."° ' They have set our Constitution
into its contemporary context by showing the debt the Framers
owed to natural law thought. For the Framers, their argument
runs, constitutions were expressions of a "higher law," rather
than simply expressions of the will of a sovereign people.
According to this view, the United States Constitution should
properly be read within the context of the "Natural Law
School" then prevalent in Europe, and it makes sense to speak of
fundamental rights embedded in the spirit, though not found in
100. See, eg., State v. Deliesseline, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 52, 60 (1821) (citing Grotius, together with English civilian writers and John Locke, in a case raising an issue that
involved the nature of republican government); see also Gerald Stourzh, Constitution:
ChangingMeaningsof the Term from the Early Seventeenth to the Late Eighteenth Century,
in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 35 (Terrence Ball & J.G.A. Pocock
eds., 1988).
101. See Edward S. Corwin, The "HigherLaw" Background of American ConstitutionalLaw, 42 HARV. L. REv. 365, 380-86 (1928); J.A.C. Grant, The "HigherLaw" Background of the Law of Eminent Domain, 6 Wis. L. REv. 67, 71 (1931); Thomas C. Grey,
Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American Revolutionary
Thought, 30 STAN. L. REv. 843, 861-63 (1978); Charles G. Haines, The Law of Nature in
State andFederalJudicialDecisions, 25 YALE L.J. 617, 622 (1916); Phillip A. Hamburger,
The Constitution'sAccomodation of Social Change, 88 MICH. L. REv. 239, 259-65 (1989);
Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127, 1167-77
(1987); Franz Wieacker, The Importance of Roman Law for Western Civilization and Western Legal Thought, 4 B.C. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 257, 260-61 (1981).
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the exact letter, of constitutional provisions.10 2 In doing this,
some of these scholars have demonstrated incidentally that civilian sources played a role in forming our Constitutional law,
because many of the natural-law principles had their origins in
Continental juristic thought.
For purposes of appreciating the place of Continental
sources in American case law, it is not necessary to enter into
this contentious subject. All that is required is to show that
ideas drawn from Continental sources were employed in American cases that raised issues of fundamental legal principle. This
is easy to do. Most examples turn out to be either cases in which
statutes were interpreted in light of natural-law principles or in
which legislative acts were challenged as unconstitutional,
although it is true that there were also cases in which the civil
law was contrasted with the common law in order to emphasize
the latter's merits, or cited as showing the strength of a fundamental legal rule because it had been enforced even under the
despotic system of Roman law.103
The majority of American cases that invoked fundamental
legal principles drawn from Continental law did so in straightforward fashion. They cited what lawyers regarded as basic
principles of law and justice drawn from the fontes of natural
law thought and from the ius gentium, treating them as relevant
for deciding current controversies. Some of the clearest such
cases involving general principles of law dealt with the rights of
aliens. 10 4 Property held by English subjects at the time of the
outbreak of hostilities, for example, presented a continuing prob102. See, e.g., Dickinson v. Dickinson, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 327, 329 (1819) (holding
legislative act changing sanction for adultery contrary to the North Carolina Declaration of

Right, "if not by the very words, at least by their fair meaning and spirit").
103. See, eg., Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518,

578 n.(a) (1819); see also Livingston v. Dorgenois, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 577, 589 (1813)
("Even under the Roman civil law, the EMPEROR himself cannot by rescript affect the
property of a person who has not been heard."); Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 7980 (1823) (citing Roman-law texts and treatise by Pufendorf in discussion of rights to
mesne profits by wrongful possessors of land); State v. Candler, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 393,
398 (1824) (exclusion of witness convicted of peijury; the basic rule being found in and
supported by the civil law, but contrasted with the superiority of its stricter application in
North Carolina, "leaving nothing to the discretion of the Court"); State v. Hobbs, 2 Tyl.
380, 381-82 (Vt. 1803) (invoking the Roman-law Digest and Beccaria to show the unreliability of judicial torture for discovering the truth, even though torture was lawful in Roman
law).
104. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Partof the NationalLaw of the

United States, 101 U. PA. L. Rv. 26, 48-49 (1952); Stewart Jay, The Status of the Law of
Nations in EarlyAmerican Law, 42 VAND. L. REv. 819, 825 (1989).
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lem. Where not specifically dealt with by treaty, the law of
nations was sometimes cited in decisions dealing with subsequent passage of title to the land. In Jackson v. White,"°5 a New
York case of 1822, for instance, the authority of Pufendorf and
Vattel was cited for the proposition that a civil war "cuts the
knot which united its members, and discharges them from their
former obligations," 10 6 thus excluding the descent of American
lands to the alien claimant. Similar in substance was a North
Carolina decision of 1824, denying an application of a British
subject to practice law within the state. It was a principle "laid
down by writers on the civil law," the court held, that a foreigner might "only claim the benefit of the law of nations,...
[not those] of any particular place." ' 7 In the North Carolina
court's view, a license to serve as an attorney was one of the
latter. More favorable to the rights of aliens, but no different in
its substantial reference to the civil law, was a Pennsylvania
habeas corpus case from 1823. In it, Chief Judge Tilghman surveyed the opinions of an extensive list of civilian writers in holding unlawful the arrest within the commonwealth of a man
accused of having committed a murder in Ireland.10
Equally revealing of the American lawyer's habits of mind
are the cases dealing with the rights of American Indians, particularly those dealing with Indian lands. In such cases, judges
sometimes looked for assistance to fundamental juristic principles drawn from the ius gentium. An 1805 Tennessee case, for
example, found the ius gentium useful in interpreting the relevant treaties and in sorting out a question of title to land derived
105. 20 Johns. 313 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
106. Id at 322.
107. See Ex parte Thompson, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 355, 362 (1824).
108. See Short v. Deacon, 10 Serg. & Rawle 125, 126-30 (Pa. 1823) (citing Grotius,
Burlamaqui, Pufendorf, Vattel, Heineccius, and Beccaria, but considering "far more important, the opinions and authorities in our own country"). For other cases involving the
rights of aliens and invoking civilian sources, see Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8
Cranch) 110, 124 (1814); Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. Wheeler, 22 F. Cas.
756, 759 (C.C.D.N.H. 1814) (No. 13,156); Robinson v. Cathcart, 2 D.C. (2 Cranch) 590,
610 (1825); Inhabitants of Manchester v. Inhabitants of Boston, 16 Mass. 230, 232 (1819);
Dulany v. Wells, 3 H. & McH. 20 (Md. 1790); Martin v. Brown, 7 N.J.L. 305, 310 (Sup.
Ct. N.J. 1799); Griswold v. Waddington, 15 Johns. 57, 68, 78 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1818); Clarke
v. Morey, 10 Johns. 69, 72, 75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1813); Marshall v. Lovelass, 1 N.C. (Cam. &
Nor.) 412, 421, 424 (1801); Lacaze, Mallet & Ross v. Pennsylvania, 1 Add. 53, 83 (Pa.
1793); M'Grath & Jones v. Isaacs, 10 S.C.L. (1 Nott & McC.) 563, 570 (1819); Turnbull v.
Ross. 1 S.C.L. (I Bay) 20, 21 (1785); Murray v. M'Carty, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 393, 397 (1811);
Commonwealth v. Walker's Ex'r, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 144, 147 (1806); Read v. Read, 9
Va. (5 Call) 160, 209, 221 (1804).
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from the Cherokee Indians. 11 9 That court announced its decision as "conformable to the law of nature applied to nations,"
citing Vattel's Law of Nations in addition to the Federalist
Papers and American notes on Blackstone's Commentaries.110
Important issues were at stake in these cases, and where guidance was needed some American judges looked to European
law.
Beyond these areas of the law, relatively natural in their use
of civilian principle because of their "international" character,
other and more unexpected cases of such use also emerge from
an examination of the pre-1825 American cases. The following
are three representative examples. In an 1824 North Carolina
case, a motion for a new trial was made after the time for seeking
appellate review had expired.'11 Taken together, however, the
circumstances involved militated strongly in favor of granting
the motion. The action taken by the trial court, which had been
presided over by a justice of the peace, had been clearly the
product of a mistake on his part. Despite that, the supreme
court denied.the motion. 1 12 The opinion cited a basic policy
favoring finality of judgments and invoked a law of Justinian and
the authority of Pothier in support of "a rule so wise and well
calculated to promote the tranquility of society." 113 In a South
Carolina case a few years earlier, the supreme court of that state
used the authority of Domat in similar fashion to interpret its
statute of limitations, which had been invoked by trespassers for
1 14
purposes of acquiring title to land by adverse possession.
"The civil law distinguishes between honest and fair possessors,
and those who possess knavishly," Judge Brevard concluded,
and "[u]pon general principles of reason, justice, and policy,
naked possession, without title, is intitled to no consideration."' 1 5 In a New Hampshire decision of 1815, an action
brought against a state official for taking an illegal fee under a
109. Glasgow's Lessee v. Smith & Blackwell, I Tenn. (1 Overt.) 144, 166 (1805); see
also Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 563 (1823); Doe v.
Welsh, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 155, 160 (1824); Thompson v. Johnston, 6 Binn. 68, 80 (Pa.
1813).

110. Glasgow's Lessee, 1 Tenn. (I Overt.) at 166.
111. See Bain v. Hunt, 10 N.C. (3 Hawks) 572, 572 (1825).
112. Id. at 573.
113. Id. at 576.
114. See Owen v. Lucas, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 519, 523 (1805).
115. Id. at 526-27; see also Strike's Case, I Bland's Rep. 57, 76 (Md. Chan. 1825)
(resting distinction on a "sound and a very generally admitted principle of justice" that was
"expressed in the Roman law").
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statute that permitted a citizen to recover a statutory penalty,
the question was whether subsequent repeal of the statute abated
the action. 116 The court decided that it did not.

17

Calling upon

what he described as a "principle of universal jurisprudence"
found in Pufendorf's Law of Nature and Nations, the judge held
that it would be an "act of absolute injustice to abolish with a
law all the effects which it had produced."' 1 8 These three decisions, quite disparate on their facts, are thus united in their use
of civil law to express a fundamental principle of justice relevant
in each.
The most dramatic examples in which American judges
made use of natural law principles were those cases where they
declared specific legislative acts invalid. Of this type, the 1816
New York case of Gardnerv. Trustees of Newburgh 119 provides
an accessible and instructive example. The New York legislature had authorized the trustees of the village to supply the village with an adequate supply of water from a stream that
Gardner had used "from time immemorial" for watering cattle,
making bricks, and distilling whiskey. On his complaint, the
Court of Chancery held this enabling statute invalid unless and
until it should be amended to make adequate provision to
indemnify him for his loss. Citing treatises by Grotius,
Pufendorf, and Bynkershoek, the New York chancellor relied on
what he described as "a clear principle of natural equity" to
invalidate the legislature's act. 20 This limitation on the power
of the legislature, he wrote, "is admitted by the soundest author121
ities.., from a deep and universal sense of its justice."'
116. Lewis v. Foster, Smith Rep. 420, 420 (N.H. 1815).
117. Id. at 423.
118. Id. at 426; see also United States v. Robins, 27 F. Cas. 825, 828 (C.C.D.S.C.
1799) (No. 16,175) (right of American sailor to resist impressment by British Navy as both
a natural right and a service to country supported by citation to Vattel's Law of Nations);
Warren v. Lynch, 5 Johns. 239, 247 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1810) (legal requirement of use of a seal
justified by citation to the Institutes of Justinian and works by Heineccius and Cicero,
criticizing lax Virginia practice); Polk's Lessee v. Hill, Windel, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 118, 134
(1811) (need for security of land titles granted by state as fundamental in nature and supported by Pothier's treatise on obligations, together with common law cases); Patterson's
Devisees v. Bradford, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 108, 111 (1807) (rules requiring plaintiff in a land
dispute to recover on the strength of his own title said to be "deducible from the principles
of natural law"); Field v. Harrison, Wythe's Rep. 273, 289 (Va. 1794) (citing Roman-law
Digest as stating "pure principles of equity" that party to a contract ought not to suffer
from fraud in the contract).
119. 2 Johns. Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816).
120. Id.at 166.
121. Id.
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Such language, coupled with express invocation of fundamental legal principle and buttressed by citation to Continental
sources, is to be found in a number of early American cases challenging the constitutionality of legislation. 122 A North Carolina
judge, citing the authority of Vattel and "principles of reason,
justice and moral rectitude" as preferable to English law on the
subject, declined to enforce a statute confirming title to land over
the objections of the heirs of a party with a colorable claim to
it. 123 "Miserable would be the condition of the people," he
wrote, "if the Judiciary was bound to carry into execution every
act of the Legislature, without regarding the paramount rule of
the constitution."' 124 A Virginia judge, after calling upon the
authority of a law from the Emperor Justinian in a case challenging a statute that varied the terms of a mutual insurance
contract, concluded that any other rule would be "to lay prostrate, at the footstool of the legislature, all our rights of person
and of property, and abandon those great objects, for the protection of which, alone, all free governments have been instituted."' 25 A Vermont judge, striking down a legislative act that
required the admission of a deceased pauper's deposition in a
pending case, found the act to be against the Constitution of the
United States, the State of Vermont, and "even against the laws
of nature."' 26 These judges were articulating a not uncommon
view: fundamental legal principles, found elegantly and persuasively stated in Continental texts and treatises, had a role in constitutional litigation.127 The Constitution of the United States
and those of the several states were understood in the light of
these civilian statements of principle.
C. Civil Law as Reinforcing English Common Law
Most of the decisions discussed so far have involved an
122. For a perspective on this issue, see John P. Reid, Another Origin of Judicial

Review: The ConstitutionalCrisis of 1776 and the Needfor a DernierJudge, 64 N.Y.U. L.
Rv. 963 (1989).
123. See Robinson v. Barfield, 6 N.C. (2 Mur.) 391, 421-22 (1818).
124. Id. at 420.
125. Currie's Adm'rs v. Mutual Assurance Soc'y, 14 Va. (4 Munf.) 315, 346-47
(1809).
126. See Dupy v. Wickwire, 1 D. Chip. 237, 238-39 (Vt. 1814).
127. See, e.g., Merrill v. Sherburne, 1 N.H. 199, 208, 212 (1818); Dickinson v. Dickinson, 7 N.C. (3 Mur.) 327, 329 (1819); Lindsay v. Commissioners, 2 S.C.L. (2 Bay) 38, 4546 (1796); Commonwealth v. Walker's Ex'r, 11 Va. (1 Hen. & M.) 144, 151-52 (1806). But
cf Goshen v. Stonington, 4 Conn. 209, 223 (1822) (refusing "to derive aid from the civil-

ians" in passing on an allegedly ex post facto law).
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imperfection, real or perceived, in the English common law.
Civil law filled a gap, mended a deficiency in the received law, or
otherwise stated a fundamental principle of natural justice better
or more fully than could be found in the English reports. It
would be mistaken, however, to conclude that providing for the
common law's inadequacies was the sole, or indeed the normal,
situation in which civil law was employed in the American cases.
Numerically at least, such cases were dwarfed by those in which
common law and civil law were basically the same, but in which
authorities from both were adduced to support a rule or a decision. For instance, a Georgia lawyer argued in 1807 that even in
the absence of an escheat statute, the property of a man who
died without heirs should be returned "back to the common
mass.., to be enjoyed by the community." 12 Citing the authority of Vattel together with that of common-law cases as directly
in point, he announced: "This is the
law of nations, the law of
'
England, and the law of America. "129
This Georgia lawyer spoke more grandly than most, but in
fact, he was describing the normal situation in which civil law
was used in the early American reports. A Massachusetts judge
in 1809, dealing with the question of whether an action of
assumpsit was extinguished by the giving of a bond for the
amount promised and having cited common-law authorities,
went on to assert that his affirmative conclusions were not based
upon "mere technical and arbitrary rules of the common
law."' 130 They were founded, he wrote, "in justice and common
sense, and are adopted by the civil law."' 31 In support, he cited
works by Domat, Pothier, and Heineccius.132 Similarly, in an
early New York case, the question was whether the fact that a
creditor had appointed one of his debtors to act as his executor
operated to extinguish the debt. 33 To show that the appointment did have that effect, the lawyer argued that the desired rule
"was not peculiar to the common law."'' 34 It was instead "a rule
of general reason ... adopted by every finished system of jurisprudence."' 135 He cited works by Voet and Pothier in support of
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

See White v. Wayne, T.U.P. Charleton Rep. 94, 98 (Ga. 1807).
Id
Banorgee v. Hovey, 5 Mass. 11, 18 (1809).
Id
Id. at 18 n.6.
See Marvin v. Stone, 2 Cow. 781, 782-83 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1824).
Id at 788.
Id (emphasis added).
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that view. 136 In a Kentucky case from 1809, the judge similarly
took care to point out that the rule of where a party made a
conditional contract but then himself prevented the condition
from occurring, the condition would be treated as fulfilled, was
"not a mere technical ... rule of the common law."' 137 It was
rather "a rule of reason and natural justice," that had been
"acknowledged by civilians as a correct rule of enlarged and liberal jurisprudence."'13938 The judge cited Pothier's treatise on obligations in support.
In addition to such cases in which a judge expressly recognized the identity of legal rules both in the civil law and at common law, there stand a considerable number of cases in which a
lawyer simply cited an authority from the civil law without
express comment. Many in fact appear in "string" citations of
common-law cases and treatises. For instance, in Troup v.
Smith, 140 a New York case of 1822, a reference to Domat's Civil
Law in its Natural Order appears almost exactly in the middle of
nineteen English and American cases cited to show that the statute of frauds could not be pleaded to bar an action brought to
recover for fraud.14 The lawyer's assumption in this, and in
other like cases, 142 seems to have been that where the two legal
systems reached identical results, adding the civil-law reference
somehow reinforced the weight of the common-law authorities.
136. Id. at 788 nn. J, K.
137. Marshall v. Craig, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 386, 391 (1809). For other examples of similar
recognition of identity, see Woodbridge v. Perkins, 3 Day 364, 373 (Conn. 1809); Bridgen
v. Cheever, 10 Mass. 450, 454 (1813); Wha~lon v. Kauffman, 19 Johns. 97, 103 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1821); Roget v. Merritt & Clapp, 2 Cai. Cas. 117, 119 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1804); Fox v.
Wilcocks, 1 Binn. 194, 197 (Pa. 1806); McKim v. Moody, 22 Va. (1 Rand.) 58, 63 (1822).
138. Marshall,4 Ky. (1 Bibb.) at 391.
139. Id
140. 20 Johns. 33 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1822).
141. Id at 38.
142. See, eg., Williams v. Reed, 29 Fed. Cas. 1386, 1392 (C.C.D. Me. 1824) (No.
17,733) (citing Pothier at end of five English cases and one treatise); Brown v. Union Ins.
Co., 5 Day 1, 3 (Conn. 1811) (citing Vattel with seven common-law cases); Wells v. Wilson,
6 Ky. (3 Bibb) 264, 265 (1814) (citing Pothier with two English citations); Carrere v. Union
Ins. Co., 3 H. & J. 324, 328 (Md. 1813) (citing Vattel in the middle of fourteen commonlaw authorities); Dawes v. Head, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 128, 145 (1825) (citing Vattel in the
middle of eleven American cases); Atherton v. Johnson, 2 N.H. 31 (1819) (citing the
Roman law Institutes with three American cases); Pawling v. Wilson & Smith, 13 Johns.
192, 208 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1816) (citing Huber together with Coke on Littleton, one English
and one Massachusetts case); Ferguson v. Phoenix Ins. Co., 5 Binn. 544, 546 (Pa. 1813)
(citing Emerigon, Valin, and Pothier with seven American cases); Harvey v. Pecks, 15 Va.
(1 Munf.), 518, 525 (Va. 1810) (citing Grotius, Pufendorf, Pothier, and the Codex together
with seven English cases).
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That the common law and the civil law should have been
the same on many points of law is of course entirely unsurprising. Many rules will be identical in all developed legal systems,
and when two societies are not vastly different in commercial
institutions, religious sentiments, cultural norms, and societal
mores, there will more than likely turn out to be few fundamental inconsistencies between their legal regimes. What is surprising, therefore, is not at all that American lawyers could have
cited Continental sources for specific rules of law, but that they
did cite them. As Dean Hoeffich has shown about Joseph Story,
most of what Story wrote could easily have been written without
citation of civil-law authorities. 143 The common law would have
sufficed, but Story added the civil law despite this. The real
question is: Why did Story, and so many other American lawyers, feel it appropriate to insert references to the civil law in
these circumstances? It is not too difficult to see why they might
turn to it when the common law was deficient or different from
the result they desired. But why when it was the same?
This has been a difficult question with which to grapple,
and an examination of the cases themselves does not reveal
explicit discussions of the issue. Nonetheless, the cases do suggest three different reasons for the use of the civil law in these
circumstances. First, in some cases, civilian learning plainly
served no purpose save ornament. A Connecticut opinion of
1803 contains a learned, but quite superfluous, disquisition on
the Roman law of marriage effected by deductio ad
thalamum. 144 Another case from five years later includes a
lengthy discussion by counsel on the laws of descent found in
Roman law and the Bible, which had only the most tenuous relevance to decision of the case. 145 In a Virginia case of 1810, questioning whether an oath to suppress dueling could be required of
applicants to the bar, counsel cited Cicero's De officis on the
dignity of official stations. 146 From the Ciceronian extract, how143. See Hoeffich, Perspectives, supra note 10, at 74.
144. See Benton v. Benton, I Day 111, 116 (Conn. 1803).
145. See Hillhouse v. Chester, 3 Day 166, 170-75 (Conn. 1808).
146. Leigh's Case, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 468, 475 (1810); see also Bank of United States v.
Sill, 5 Conn. 102, 112 (1823) (use of Latin quotation to explain error of Lord Ellenborough); Clemson v. Davidson, 4 Binn. 405, 416 (Pa. 1812) (likening the sale of goods to the
struggle between Ajax and Ulysses). I confess that such ornamental usage seemed to me
characteristic of the famous Virginian, George Wythe, in many of the opinions from his
Reports cited in Bryson, supra note 13, at 141-43. But compare his learned treatment of
concurrent tenancies in GEORGE WYTHE, DECISIONS OF CASES IN VIRGINIA BY THE
HIGH COURT OF CHANCERY app. 361, 390 (1795) (concluding that there existed "an exact
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ever, he drew no conclusions whatsoever. It is difficult-indeed
impossible-to regard these uses of civilian authorities as anything but a show of classical learning. We need not despise them
on that account, but we cannot fairly describe them as influential. They simply show once again the great prestige that the
trappings of ancient civilization held for many American lawyers during the Republic's early years.
Second, there were many cases where American lawyers
recognized that the civil law had already been taken into the
common law. Where a rule from Roman law had "been incorporated into our law and become a part thereof," as a New
Jersey lawyer put the matter in 1811,147 there was every reason

to look directly to civilian learning for guidance in interpreting
and applying the rule. Maritime law, 148 conflicts of law, 149 pro-

bate and testamentary succession, 150 and many of the rules regulating the formation of marriage, 5 1 were all aspects of the law
where this had happened. The English cases on these subjects
had themselves been shaped by civilian and canonical doctrines,
and American lawyers knew this.1 52 As one South Carolina
judge explicitly recognized, Roman law had furnished a "rich
source from whence many of the best principles of the common
agreement between [the law of Virginia] and the civil law ... respecting the consequences
of the so-called jus accrescendi.").
147. Rosevelt v. Gardner, 3 N.J.L. 358, 359 (N.J. 1811); see also Griffin v. Executors
of Griffin, R.M. Charlton 217, 227 (Ga. 1822) (wills of lunatics made during lucid intervals); Dumaresly v. Fishly, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh) 368, 372 (1821) (marriage laws); Smith
v. Frost, 4 Ky. (1 Bibb) 375, 377 (1809) (the law of bailments); Bridgen v. Cheever, 10
Mass. 450, 454 (1813) (liability of legatees under will for decedent's debts); Baker v. Preston, 21 Va. (Gilmer) 235, 272 (Va. 1821) (definition of embezzlement).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 32-40.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 80-89.
150. See, e.g., Nicholls v. Hodges' Ex'r, 2 D.C. (2 Cranch) 582, 584 (1825); Jackson
ex dem. Van Vechten v. Sill, 11 Johns. 201, 210 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814); White v. Helmes, 12
S.C.L. (1 McCord) 430,438 (1821); Bates v. Holman, 13 Va. (3 Hen. & M. 502, 520 (1809).
151. Dumaresly, 10 Ky. (3 A.K. Marsh.) at 372 ("[lit is a maxim of the common law,
borrowed, it is true, from the civil law . . . that consensus non concubitus facit
matrimonium.");see also Benton v. Benton, I Day 111, 116 (Conn. 1803); West Cambridge
v. Lexington, 18 Mass. (1 Pick.) 506, 510 (1823); Londonderry v. Chester, 2 N.H. 268, 273
(1820); Sterling v. Sinnickson, 5 N.J.L. 756, 757 (1820); Purcell v. Purcell, 15 Va. (4 Hen.
& M.) 507, 515 (1810).
152. See, e.g., Murry v. Claybom, 5 Ky. (2 Bibb) 300, 300 (1811) ("Mhe common
law has adopted the maxim of the civil law, that ex nudopacto non orituractio."); Cook &
Pratt v. Commercial Ins. Co., 11 Johns. 40, 44 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1814) (This was a maritime
case, in which counsel argued that, "Marshall, who cites the doctrine of Emerigon, does it
with approbation, and seems not to consider it, in this respect, as different from the English
Law.").
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law have been derived." 153 In these areas of the law, therefore,
civilian learning could be consulted without self-consciousness
and cited without incongruity. Reference to Continental treatises might appropriately be put directly alongside the English
(or American) cases.
Third, the period being discussed, 1790-1825, was a time
before legal positivism dominated the assumptions of most lawyers. To lawyers of this period, law derived its ultimate authority from immemorial custom and natural reason, not simply
from the will of a sovereign.15 4 In such a climate of opinion,
citation to a system of law that learned men had described as
ratio scripta might be warranted, even where it happened to
coincide with one's own municipal law. Particularly when there
was doubt about the justice of a legal rule, an "inquiry into the
grounds" of the rule might legitimately be made and appropriately entail examination of Continental law. 55 Congruence
1 56
between the systems would beget confidence in the result.
Articulation of this view is found in many of the reported
cases. One North Carolina judge spoke for many in describing
and justifying his decision as "founded no less upon the weight
and number of the cases than upon the intrinsic justice of the
principle which pervades them."' 157 Many American lawyers
would have agreed with Justice Story, who termed it "no slight
recommendation" of a rule of American law that it stood
153. See Smith v. McCall, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 220, 222 (1821).
154. See, eg., Hickman v. Boffman, 3 Ky. (Hard.) 356, 372-73 (1809) ("There are
many books which are not authority, but which ought to be read and used for the sound
and clear reasoning they contain, as Poethier [sic] on Obligations."); Thompson v. M'Kim,
6 H. & J. 302, 305 (Md. 1825) ("[W]e should perpetually bear in mind, that it is the reason
and spirit of cases make law, not the letter of particular precedents."); see also Moss v.
Wood., R. M. Charlton 42, 44 (Ga. 1819) ("[D]ecisions of [English] courts are received
here not as constituting the law, but only as evidence of what it is."); Parker v. Kennedy, 1
S.C.L. (1 Bay) 398, 420 (1795) (although civil law has "no intrinsic obligation here" it is
nevertheless cited "as a rule of reason"); Dandridge v. Lyon, Wythe's Rep. 123, 125 (Va.
1791) (Authority of the Roman civil law "if not decisive, is respectable in cases of testamentary dispositions.").
155. See, eg., Hannan v. Towers, 3 H. & J. 147, 149 (Md. 1810) (examining the civil
law in connection with a controversy about applicability of the doctrine of consideration).
156. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Virtues of Redundancy in Legal Thought,
38 CLEV. ST. L. Rnv. 153 (1990).
157. Williamson's Adm'rs v. Smart, 1 N.C. (Cam. & Nor.) 355, 362 (1801); see also
Foster v. Essex Bank, 16 Mass. 245, 266 (1819) (arguing that special status for corporations
was illegitimate both by "the reasoning in our own courts" and "the authority of the civilians"); State v. Deliesseline, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 52, 60, 62 (1821) (citing both civilian
and common-law authority on question so far not "settled upon any fixed or established
principle" of whether delegated authority could be exercised by a bare majority).
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"approved by the cautious learning of Valin, the moral perspicacity of Pothier, and the practical and sagacious judgment of
Emerigon." 158 Even where the common law dictated a particular result, it would have been useful to note that Roman law was
in accord, because the congruence would show that the common
law was agreeable to reason and sound principles of jurisprudence. A decision could be more than simply following previous
cases. It would also be just. Lawyers who thought about law in
these terms, who believed that "principles of universal jurisprudence" actually existed,15 9 easily concluded that their search for
justice could, and sometimes did, appropriately call for exploration within the rich resources of the civil law. Contemporary
canons of jurisprudence did not confine them to common-law
cases.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The evidence surveyed here shows beyond doubt that civillaw sources were known and used in the early American case
law. They were not used simply for purposes of education,
adornment, and occasional large thinking, although of course
they clearly were used for all these purposes. The ease and ubiquity of reference to the civil law and to the treatise tradition that
surrounded it stands out in the American cases. This reference
was never confined to one or two areas of the law, it was not
indulged in by a small group of men, and it was not limited to a
few areas of the country. Let it be said again that this ubiquity
does not mean that the civil law was used with great frequency.
Nor does it demonstrate a thorough mastery of the civil law on
the part of those who used it. However, it does mean that the
civil law was known to large numbers of American lawyers and
that it was referred to by them in a wide variety of cases. Turning to civilian sources was not the resort of a privileged few, and
its use was not narrowly restricted in time or extent.
To the fundamental question of assessing the extent to
which the civil law made a substantive difference in the develop158. Peele v. Merchants' Ins. Co., 19 F. Cas. 98, 102 (C.C.D. Mass. 1822) (No.

10,905); see also Smith v. Lessee of Craig, 2 Tenn. (2 Overt.) 287, 293 (1814) ("The further
we advance in knowledge, the more sensible we are of our own weakness and limited powers: and with the greater pleasure will the mind seize those principles which have been
tested by experience, in preference to the fairest and most beautiful theories.").
159. See, e.g., Lewis v. Foster, Smith Rep. 420, 424 (N.H. 1815) (dealing with the
reach of retrospective legislation).
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ment of American law, no definitive answer emerges from an
examination of the early American cases. Any conclusions must
be guarded conclusions. The perils of enthusiasm are all too
obvious. The enthusiast must never forget the indisputable fact
that, statistically speaking, the civil law played a distinctly
minor role in the cases. It was employed, but except in special
areas of the law it was not used with anything remotely
approaching the frequency of use of the English common law.
Moreover, two persistent difficulties stand in the way of
accurate and confident assessment of the influence of the civil
law in this country. On the one hand, counting the number of
mentions of civilian sources can easily overstate its true influence. Many of the cases invoking civil law sources could have
been decided without them. Where the common- and civil-law
rules were the same, this must have been so, and even where
they diverged the civil law often played a subsidiary role in
decision.
On the other hand, the evidence from counting citations
may equally understate the true, long-range influence of civil
law. Once a civil-law principle had been taken and used in a
common-law case, the rule might subsequently be followed simply on the basis of that first case, influencing some succeeding
lawyers who have had not the slightest consciousness of the
rule's civilian origins. This sort of silent influence clearly happened, 160 and a few American lawyers later recognized that it
had happened. 161 The sum of it is that the question posed at the
start of this Article-what was the real influence of the civil
law?-turns out to be a difficult question to answer fairly and
completely.
Any full assessment must also take into account the fact of
disagreement among lawyers of the period. Some American
lawyers followed the "light of the civil law" as a sure guide for
,their inquiries. 62 Others regarded its use as simple "wandering
160. A clear example comes from the law relating to possession of wild animals.
Compare Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. R. 175, 177 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (applying law found in
and cited from civilian authors) with Buster v. Newkirk, 20 Johns. 75, 75 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1822) (trover for deer skin; the court holding that "[t]he principles decided in the case of
Pierson v. Post are applicable here," without citing the civil law).
161. See, e.g., Boyd v. Anderson, 1 Tenn. (1 Overt.) 437, 440 (1809) (referring to
Lord Mansfield and stating that "his principles in this respect, were principally derived
from the Roman Law").
162. Bean v. Smith, 2 F. Cas. 1143, 1153 (C.C.D.R.I. 1821) (No. 1,174).
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into the wilds of antiquity." 163 All the evidence does not point in
an identical direction, and doubtless it is true that choice of
whether to invoke the civil law often depended upon16which side
of a particular case the civil law happened to favor. 4
When these caveats have been entered, however, one conclusion remains undeniable. The American reports from
between 1790 and 1825 do show that the admiration for European and classical traditions which was a part of the early American experience in so many other .areas of life, also made its way
into the case law. Legal practice and intellectual tastes were not
wholly separate spheres of life. The civil law was therefore not a
purely academic concern in the early American Republic.

163. Dulany v. Wells, 3 H. & McH. 20, 49 (Md. 1790).
164. See, e.g., Bedinger v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. (3 Call) 461, 464 (1803) (On the
legal consequences of a unilateral promise, one counsel argued that the correct interpretation was "the language of reason, and formed part of the Roman law... as a principle of
universal jurisprudence." The other counsel countered that the nature of a promise should
"be understood in the sense at common law; and not according to the opinions of civilians,
and the compilers of dictionaries." The case ultimately went off on a jurisdictional point.).
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